This post marks the eighth and final installment in my series on four prominent theories concerning the nature of the mind. Note, of course, that I will be covering the nature of the mind in even greater depth in future posts on this blog. This series, however, has finally come to an end. In this final post, then, I will give a final assessment of plausibility of the four theories. For requisite context, it would be best to check out Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 5, and 6, and 7. Let’s get into it! Continue reading
Rene Descartes provided a number of arguments for the immateriality of the mind. For that requisite context, check out Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3. Today we shall briefly evaluate the principal objection to Cartesianism: the interaction problem. Without further ado, let’s evaluate Descartes’ arguments from dubitability and divisibility.
Can you make consciousness out of sand? You can squeeze it, punch it, toss it in the air, or do all sorts of things to it. But is any of that sufficient for conscious experience?
This post marks the first installment of my series on philosophical theories concerning the nature of the mind. Is mere sand (or other configurations of particles) sufficient for conscious experience? What is the relation between particles and people?
It is to these questions that we turn in this series. So sit back, relax, and put your thinking cap on!
Before delving into the following argument, it will be helpful to clarify the relevant notion of probability at play. First, probabilities are understood as reasonable degrees of expectation (i.e. epistemic probability). In a probability analysis which employs epistemic probabilities, we are concerned not so much with the way the world actually is apart from our justified acceptances, i.e. how likely things are by their nature; rather, we are concerned with the degree to which we expect an outcome given our justified acceptances. Continue reading