Details and Errata for Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs (Springer, 2023)

My new book is now available for order! See the bottom of this post for a list of errata and clarifications.

Book description: This book critically assesses arguments for the existence of the God of classical theism, develops an innovative account of objects’ persistence, and defends new arguments against classical theism. The authors engage the following classical theistic proofs: Aquinas’s First Way, Aquinas’s De Ente argument, and Feser’s Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, Augustinian, Thomistic, and Rationalist proofs. The authors also provide the first systematic treatment of the ‘existential inertia thesis’. By connecting the thesis to relativity theory and recent developments in the philosophy of physics, and by developing a variety of novel existential-inertia-friendly explanations of persistence, they mount a formidable new case against classical theistic proofs. Finally, they defend new arguments against classical theism based on abstract objects and changing divine knowledge. The text appeals to students, researchers, and others interested in classical theistic proofs, the existence and nature of God, and the ultimate explanations of persistence, change, and contingency.

The preface: Read the preface here (PDF)

How to get the book:

• The hardcover is $129.99 and can be purchased at the Springer website or Amazon
• The eBook (PDF and EPUB) is $99 and can be purchased at at the Springer website or Amazon
• The Kindle version can be rented for as low as $41.70 at Amazon
• Many institutions and libraries have purchased Springer’s philosophy and religion eBook packages, which offer everyone with institutional or library access free, downloadable PDF and EPUB versions of the book. Princeton, for instance, falls into this category, and so I (along with any Princeton student, professor, or researcher) was able to freely download the book. Thus, check your local library or university to see if you can get access to the book. Even if your local library or university hasn’t purchased the Springer eBook packages, you can still ask your librarian if they can do an interlibrary loan for the book. This is another way to get ahold of the book without selling a kidney.
• Those with library/institutional access to the book also have another benefit: they can order a MyCopy of the book for only $39.99, which is a softcover version of the book.
• If none of this works for you, email me, and I can help!
• I had no say over the price! The reason it’s so expensive is that Springer primarily serves libraries, not individuals. This is true of many academic books and presses. Springer also keeps basically all the money made from sales.

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Errata & Clarifications

1. Typesetting

Unfortunately, the typesetters occasionally introduced some wonky formatting and indentation. Thankfully, it doesn’t detract from understanding!

2.  Section 2.2 (pp. 18-19): Clarification about the validity of McNabb and DeVito’s (2020) first way

Oppy’s (2006) formulation of the first way has four premises, all couched in terms of ‘change’, ‘changed’, and ‘changers’. McNabb and DeVito (2020) propose adding a premise to that formulation to render the argument valid. Their revised formulation keeps those four premises exactly as they are, but adds a fifth premise couched in terms of ‘moves’ and ‘moved’. Further, the additional premise is simply a logical truth: what moves something else is either moved or not moved. That is: ∀x∀y(Mxy → (Mx v ~Mx)).

There are two independent reasons why this addition cannot make any difference to the validity of Oppy’s initial formulation: (a) all of the non-logical symbols used in the added sentence occur only in the added sentence; and (b) the added sentence is a logical truth. But an invalid argument cannot become a valid argument by the addition of a premise whose non-logical symbols occur only in the added sentence; and an invalid argument cannot become a valid argument by the addition of a logical truth.

In pp. 18-19 of our book, we gave the impression that we agreed with McNabb and DeVito that the revised argument makes a difference to validity. We should have given no such impression. We were really just trying to be conciliatory and signal that we wanted to assess McNabb and DeVito’s formulation, not Oppy’s.

3.  Sect. 8.2.1 (p. 266): Replace two instances of ‘timelessness’ with ‘immutability’

The wording in the original text is a bit confusing. It makes more sense when we replace two instances of ‘timelessness’ with ‘immutability’. That’s how the dilemma in this section should be construed. So, below, I’ve given a better version of the section. I’ve bolded the two changes:

This correction also applies to our short summary of this section on p. 368 in Sect. 12.2.2.2. That summary should be changed in a similar manner:

4.  Section 7.3.8 (p. 237): Replace “the Thomistic view”

We originally wrote the following on p. 237: “Consider that the Thomistic view of esse seems to engender a (vicious) infinite regress.” But this is imprecise, since there are many Thomistic views about the nature and role of esse.

This sentence should instead say: “Consider that at least one prominent Thomistic view of esse — and the one operative in Nemes’ argument — seems to engender a (vicious) infinite regress.”

5.  Precisely formulating the argument from pp. 85-86

I want to provide a more precise formulation of the argument from pp. 85-86 (Sect. 4.3), as someone reached out to me and noted that it wasn’t clear to them how the argument goes. So, here’s roughly how I would put the argument from pp. 85-86 (where temporal concrete object O exists at t and t’ is some arbitrary time later than t):

1. Suppose CP is true.
2. If CP is true, then if a potential is actualized, then something already actual causally actualizes that potential.
3. So, if a potential is actualized, then something already actual causally actualizes that potential. (1, 2)
4. If O ceases to exist at t’, then O’s potential for cessation at t’ is actualized.
5. So, if O ceases to exist at t’, then something already actual causally actualizes O’s cessation at t’. (3, 4)
6. So, if nothing already actual causally actualizes O’s cessation at t’, then O does not cease to exist at t’. (5)
7. If (6) is true, then (since t’ is arbitrary) if nothing already actual causally actualizes O’s cessation during [t, t’], then O does not cease to exist during [t, t’].
8. If O does not cease to exist during [t, t’], then O persists throughout [t, t’].
9. So, if nothing already actual causally actualizes O’s cessation during [t, t’], then O persists throughout [t, t’]. (6-8)
10. Absences are not actual things.
11. If absences are not actual things, then absences cannot serve as already actual causal actualizers of O’s cessation during [t, t’].
12. So, absences cannot serve as already actual causal actualizers of O’s cessation during [t, t’]. (10, 11)
13. If (12) is true, then if (i) there’s an absence of sustenance (of O) from without during [t, t’], and (ii) there’s also an absence of sufficiently destructive positive factors operating on O during [t, t’], then nothing already actual causally actualizes O’s cessation using [t, t’].
14. So, if (i) there’s an absence of sustenance (of O) from without during [t, t’], and (ii) there’s also an absence of sufficiently destructive positive factors operating on O during [t, t’], then nothing already actual causally actualizes O’s cessation using [t, t’]. (12, 13)
15. So, if (i) there’s an absence of sustenance (of O) from without during [t, t’], and (ii) there’s also an absence of sufficiently destructive positive factors operating on O during [t, t’], then O persists throughout [t, t’]. (9, 14)
16. If (15) is true, then temporal concrete objects persist in existence when both destructive factors and sustenance from without are absent.
17. If temporal concrete objects persist in existence when both destructive factors and sustenance from without are absent, then EIT is true.
18. So, EIT is true. (15-17)
19. So, if CP is true, then EIT is true. (1-18)

Now, technically, this argument only concerns EIT as informally articulated earlier in the chapter: “In simplest terms, EIT is the claim that at least some temporal concrete objects persist in the absence of both (i) sustenance or conservation from without and (ii) sufficiently destructive factors operative on the object(s).” Call this the informal-EIT. To get to the EIT as formally articulated in chapter 5 — which we can call formal-EIT — we would have to show not only that some temporal concrete objects persist when (i) and (ii) are absent, but also that (i) actually is absent for some temporal concrete objects.

But inferring that isn’t particularly difficult given informal-EIT. If temporal concrete objects need external sustenance in order to persist, then it would be false that some temporal concrete objects persist when (i) and (ii) are absent — i.e., informal-EIT would be false. So, if informal-EIT is true, then temporal concrete objects don’t need external sustenance in order to persist. But if temporal concrete objects don’t need external sustenance in order to persist, then since temporal concrete objects plausibly do need an adequate explanation in order to persist, it follows that the persistence of temporal concrete objects can be adequately explained without appealing to external sustenance. But then we shouldn’t posit external sustenance because it’s explanatorily otiose, and hence we should embrace formal-EIT given informal-EIT.

6.  Typos

p. 101: The indented “1.” at the top of the page should be an indented “3.”

p. 103: The typesetters butchered our citation of Loke. “Ter Loke, Andrew, and Ern” should say “Loke, Andrew Ter Ern”

p. 211, fn 28: “Ccrucially” should be “Crucially”

(I believe there are a few more typos, but I forgot to mark them in my book!)

Author: Joe