Some short (quasi?) tensions between DDS and Trinitarianism

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Orthodox, conciliar Trinitarianism (henceforth ‘Trinitarianism’) is committed the following theses: (i) there is one God in three divine persons; (ii) the three divine persons are not numerically identical to one another; (iii) the divine persons are consubstantial (i.e. of one substance) or homoousios; and (iv) the divine persons are distinguished and related by eternal processions (the Father begets the Son, and either (a) the Father and Son spirate the Spirit or (b) the Father alone spirates the Spirit). There are different ways to understand these eternal processions, but they at least involve receiving/deriving existence from without (i.e. from some numerically distinct divine person(s)).[1]

[1] Btw, you need to watch this video if you want to understand why one might find DDS and Trinitarianism incompatible, as well as how one might respond to such worries (and respond to those responses, and respond to those responses to those responses, and…).

DEAR FATHER | Seeing the Trinity in daily life helps us understand the mystery | Articles | Archdiocese of St Louis

I don’t know if any of the following arguments work. I also don’t know how strong they are; not being an expert in the literature here, I can only put forward these arguments as proposals, tests, tools. I don’t claim that any of them work; nor do I claim that any of them fail. Honestly, this post is mainly an experiment; I’m trying to test out some apparent, prima facie tensions–perhaps quasi-tensions, I don’t know–that the conjunction of DDS and Trinitarianism seems to engender.[2]

[2] Also: Because all of these arguments are simply experimental in nature, I won’t be fleshing out the justifications for their premises in much detail. In most cases, though, the premises look individually appealing at least on first glance (given an understanding of DDS and orthodox Trinitarianism).

The spirit of this post, then, is the same as Section 12 of this post. Here’s what I said there:

I’ll try to make this post reasonably representative of some of the prima facie tensions my mind seems to face when grappling with the conjunction of DDS and Trinitarianism. For this reason, I have reproduced (and, as the case may be, slightly modified) a number of the puzzles I leveled in Section 12 of this post. But I have also added some puzzles, too. I might also update this post as time goes on. I invite any and all help in resolving any of these puzzles![3]

[3] For what it’s worth, I plan to arrange another discussion on DDS and Trinitarianism between Dr. Ryan Mullins and Dr. Timothy Pawl. It would probably be late Spring or early Summer. Stay tuned.

Here’s an outline of this post:

1 Different power
2 Divine processions and divine independence
3 Intrinsic but distinct
4 From individuating features
5 Essential Trinitarian-hood
6 One in essence
7 Multiplicity (allegedly) requires a cause
8 Processions and DDS
9 Incarnation, Trinity, and Simplicity: Oh My!
10 Multiplicity of Divine Acts

1 Different power

Consider:

  1. The Father has [and, of course, necessarily exercises] the power to generate the Son.
  2. Nothing has the power to generate itself.
  3. So, the Son does not have the power to generate the Son. [2]
  4. So, the Father and Son have different powers. [1,3]

Now, there are different ways to go here:

5. If the Father and Son have different powers, then there are different powers in God.
6. So, there are different powers in God. [4,5]
7. If S is absolutely simple, then there aren’t different powers in S; all S’s powers are identical.
8. So, God isn’t absolutely simple. [6,7]
9. If DDS is true, then God is absolutely simple.
10. So, DDS is not true. [8,9]

Here’s another way to go:

5*. If the Father’s power to generate the Son is accidental to the Father, then the Father has an accident.
6*. If DDS is true, nothing divine has an accident.
7*. The Father is divine.
8*. So, if DDS is true, then the Father does not have an accident. [6*,7*]
9*. So, if DDS is true, then the Father’s power to generate the Son is not accidental to the Father. [5*,8*]
10*. If the Father’s power to generate the Son is not accidental to the Father, then it is essential to the Father.
11*. So, if DDS is true, then the Father’s power to generate the Son is essential to the Father. [9*,10*]
11*: If x is essential to the Father but not essential to divinity, then the Father’s essence is not divinity.
12*. The Father’s essence is divinity.
13*. So, if the power to generate the Son is essential to the Father, then the power to generate the Son is essential to divinity. [11*,12*]
14*. So, if DDS is true, then the power to generate the Son is essential to divinity. [11*,13*]
15*. If x is essential to divinity, then (since the Son is divine) the Son has x.
16*. So, if DDS is true, then the Son has the power to generate the Son. [14*,15*]
17*. So, DDS is not true. [3,16*]

2 Divine processions and divine independence

This is more-so an argument against the doctrine of divine procession:

  1. If x is divine, then x is ultimate/independent/a se.
  2. If x is ultimate/independent/a se, then x does not derive/receive existence from without.
  3. If x derives/receives existence from something numerically distinct from x, then x is not divine. [1,2]
  4. The Son derives/receives existence from the Father. [Trinitarianism]
  5. The Father is numerically distinct from the Son. [Trinitarianism]
  6. So, the Son is not divine. [3-5]
  7. If Orthodox/Conciliar Trinitarianism is true, then the Son is divine.
  8. So, Orthodox/Conciliar Trinitarianism is not true. [6,7]

Note that many Trinitarians reject the doctrine of divine processions for this very reason.

3 Intrinsic but distinct

Consider:

Here’s the first experiment:

  1. If DDS is true, then whatever is intrinsic to (i.e. in; within; not outside of; not disjoint from; not external to) God is numerically identical to God.
  2. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each intrinsic to God.
  3. So, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each numerically identical to God.
  4. If the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each numerically identical to God, then (since numerical identity is transitive) the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each numerically identical to one another.
  5. It is not the case that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each numerically identical to one another.
  6. So, DDS is false.
  • Premise (1) seems to follow from the definition of DDS: whatever God has, God is. Whatever is in God is God.
    • God is pure, undifferentiated, unqualified, unlimited being or actuality. He is the very act of being — Being Subsisting. If there’s any x intrinsic to God but not identical to God, then it seems God wouldn’t be the sheer act of being itself but would instead be being plus some further x.

Also, premise (1) is pretty explicit in articulations of DDS. Consider:

According to DDS, x is part of S iff (i) x is some positive ontological item intrinsic to S and (ii) x is not (numerically) identical to S. Or, more simply (and applied to God): “Anything intrinsic to God is identical to God” (Fakhri Forthcoming). As Fakhri points out, this is a straightforward entailment of DDS. Indeed, this understanding of parts accords with how DDS is traditionally articulated. As Augustine famously put it, God is what he has (Augustine, The City of God, XI, 10). Similarly with Anselm: addressing God, he writes that “you are whatever you are… you are the very life by which you live, the wisdom by which you are wise, the very goodness by which you are good” (Proslogion, ch. 12). Also later in the Proslogion: “[Y]ou are what you are, since whatever you are in any way or at any time, you are wholly and always that ” (ch. 22). Vallicella (2019) similarly follows suit: “God is ontologically simple… there is nothing intrinsic to God that is distinct from God.” Other scholars in models of God are similarly explicit about this conception of parthood in relation to DDS:

  • “There is no metaphysical or physical composition in God [under DDS], such that: (i) there is no distinction in God between substance/attribute, essence/existence, form/matter, act/potency, genus/differentia, agent/action, and essence/accident; and (ii) all of God’s intrinsic features are identical not only to each other but to God Himself”, where a ‘feature’ is “a generic term covering any positive ontological item (e.g. properties, attributes, tropes, modes, states, actions, accidents, forms, matter, acts of existence, essences, etc.)” (Schmid and Mullins Forthcoming).
  • For Aquinas, “everything intrinsic to God is really identical to the divine nature” (Spencer 2017, p. 123). It should be added, moreover, that the divine nature is identical to God himself under classical theism.
  • “On the standard understanding of this doctrine—as epitomized in the work of philosophers such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas—there are no distinctions to be drawn between God and his nature, goodness, power, or wisdom. On the contrary, God is identical with each of these things, along with anything else that can be predicated of him intrinsically” (Brower 2009, p. 105).
  • “Whatever can be intrinsically attributed to God must be the single, undivided unity that is God” (Stump 2013, p. 33).
  • “The divine substance is not composed in any way; nor are there entities intrinsic to God distinct from the divine substance”, where ‘entities’ are “positive ontological items of any sort” (Grant 2012, p. 254). Elsewhere Grant articulates DDS as affirming that all that is in God is numerically identical with God (Grant and Spencer 2015, p. 5).
  • “The classical doctrine of simplicity… famously holds forth the maxim that there is nothing in God that is not God. If there were, that is, if God were not ontologically identical with all that is in him, then something other than God would be needed to account for his existence, essence, and attributes” (Dolezal 2011, p. xvii). (See also the various references contained in chapters 1 and 2 of Dolezal (2011) further attesting to this.)

There are also straightforward paths from classical theism to this understanding of parthood. For instance: if there were something intrinsic to God but distinct from God, then there would be something that is not God without which God wouldn’t exist—God would in some sense be dependent on something that is not God. And for many classical theists, this dependence seems incompatible with divine aseity.[4]

[4] Cf. Vallicella (2019) and Williams (2013, p. 96)

Moreover, as Katherin Rogers points out, for classical theism “whatever is not God is created by Him” (1996, p. 167). Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey Brower likewise emphasize that—under classical theism—“(i) God does not depend on anything distinct from himself for his existing and (ii) everything distinct from God depends on God’s creative activity for its existing” (2006, p. 361).[5] This entails that there cannot be anything that is not God that is intrinsic to God. For this intrinsic thing would either be essential or non-essential. If essential, then (since whatever is not God is created by God, per classical theism) it follows that God creates something essential to him. But this is incoherent; nothing can create something essential to itself, for it would already have to exist (and hence have its essence) in order to create anything in the first place. But if non-essential, then there would be some potency in God.[6] Moreover, it would be an accident (i.e. some intrinsic but non-essential item) of God, and DDS explicitly denies God can have accidents. Therefore, under classical theism there cannot be anything that is not God that is within or intrinsic to God. A part, then—according to classical theism—is something intrinsic to a thing but distinct from that thing.

[5] See also Grant (2019, ch. 1) and the countless references therein concerning classical theism’s commitment to God’s creation of everything numerically distinct from God.

[6] By definition, if S is F non-essentially, then S could have failed to be F. Hence, S would have some potency not to be or have F. (Potency, as we saw earlier, roughly corresponds to unrealized or unactualized possibility.)

Potential response: The domain of quantification for ‘whatever is in God is God’ is restricted only to non-relational attributes. So, God’s power, goodness, intellect, will, etc. are all identical to one another and God. But the persons are subsisting relations, and hence DDS is silent as to their identity with each other and God.

Potential reply:

  • Persons as relations seems to be a category error (Cf. this post)
  • Relations plausibly presuppose relata, and hence relations presuppose non-relational ontological items (whether attributes or otherwise)
    • Relations presuppose relata. In other words, there can’t be a relation without relata to stand in the relation.
    • Now, the relations amongst the persons in the trinity are not merely reflexive relations. For instance, nothing can ‘beget’, ‘generate’, or ‘spirate’ itself. So, the relations are not reflexive. But if relations presuppose relata, and the relata aren’t reflexive, then there are three, distinct, non-relational positive ontological items standing in these various relations.
  • Relational distinctions seem to entail non-relational attribute distinctions as well
    • The attributes ‘being the Father’, ‘being the Son’, etc.

Here’s perhaps the clearest way to put this problem, which is a slight variant of my original premise-by-premise articulation:

  1. If DDS is true, then anything with positive ontological status that is in God is numerically identical to God.
  2. Numerical identity is transitive. [Self-evident to me]
  3. Each divine person has positive ontological status. [Self-evident to me, assuming Trinitarianism; to deny this premise is to deny that the divine persons exist.]
  4. So, if DDS is true, then each divine person is numerically identical to God. [1,3]
  5. So, if DDS is true, then each divine person is numerically identical to one another. [2,4]
  6. If Trinitarianism is true, then each divine person is numerically distinct from one another.
  7. So, if DDS is true, then Trinitarianism is not true. [5,6]

[Among other reasons for accepting Premise (1), here’s one. If there were something with positive ontological status in God that is numerically distinct from God, then there is something that is not God without which God would not exist, which is contrary to the classical theistic conception of divine aseity.]

4 From individuating features

This experimental argument makes use of (a version of) the principle called the Identity of Indiscernibles: if x and y exist, and if there is no feature[7] that x has that y lacks, and if there is no feature that y has that x lacks, then x is numerically identical to y. In other words: if x and y share all and only one-and-the-same features–such that there is literally no feature that one has which the other lacks–then x=y.

[7] By ‘feature’, I mean any positive ontological item (i.e. anything with existence/being/reality; anything of which it is true to say ‘it is within reality’, ‘it exists’).

This principle is logically equivalent to: If x and y are distinct, then there is some feature one has that the other lacks.

Why believe this principle? Well, if there were absolutely no features that one had that the other lacked, then the difference (non-identity) between the two things in question seems inexplicable (see Feser (2017) for a defense of this line of reasoning). There would be no feature that accounts for their real distinction. There would be no individuating feature that accounts for how and why they’re not identical. There is literally nothing that one has which the other lacks, and hence there is literally nothing that could ground or account for their non-identity. Their non-identity is just brute, inexplicable.

This—in conjunction with the non-identity among persons of the Trinity—entails a multiplicity of distinct features (positive ontological items) intrinsic to God, which is incompatible with DDS.

Potential objection: Couldn’t different relations of opposition be the individuating features?

Potential response: It seems, though, that x and y standing in a non-reflexive relation already presupposes that x and y are non-identical in the first place, for if x and y were identical, then clearly x and y couldn’t stand in a non-reflexive relation.[8] But if that’s the case, then the non-identity (distinctness) of x and y cannot be constituted by their standing in a non-reflexive relation. There must ‘already’ be (as it were) individuating feature(s) between them, in which case their distinction won’t be accounted for in terms of different relations but instead in terms of different features. (Two more problems with this response: (i) these relations themselves will be positive ontological items intrinsic to but numerically distinct from one another (and hence numerically distinct from God, since numerical identity is transitive), in which case these relations seem to count as parts (cf. above); (ii) these relations’ being distinct from one another just pushes the application of the Identity of Indiscernibles back a step. In order for them to be distinct, there must (per this principle) be some difference in their features. Thus, this response doesn’t avoid the worry but merely re-locates it. Aaaaand I just realized that I already made this point in the next non-footnote paragraph… lol.)

[8] Moreover, relations seem in some sense less ontologically fundamental than their relata. Put another way, relata seem more ontologically fundamental than the relations in which they stand. Relations depend on their relata, not the other way around. But if that’s the case, then the non-identity between x and y cannot be constituted by an irreflexive relation in which they stand, since their standing in such a relation would already presuppose the more fundamental reality of the distinct x and y. It must be the case that x and y are ‘already’ distinct in order for them to stand in an irreflexive relation, since relations are in some sense dependent upon and hence posterior to their relata.

Finally, appealing to relations of opposition to account for the non-identity seems to simply push the problem back a step. For in virtue of what are the relations distinct from one another? It would seem that there would have to be some feature that one has that the other lacks — otherwise, their real difference/distinction would be inexplicable. And hence an appeal to relations of opposition doesn’t solve the problem but only reinforces it.

5 Essential Trinitarian-hood

Terminology: ‘S is Trinitarian’ means ‘S exists in three persons//S has three persons in/within/intrinsic to S’

Experimental argument:

  1. God is essentially Trinitarian.
  2. If God is essentially Trinitarian, then for any x, if x’s essence is numerically identical with God’s essence, then x is Trinitarian.
  3. So, for any x, if x’s essence is numerically identical with God’s essence, then x is Trinitarian. [1,2]
  4. The Father’s [else: Son’s or Spirit’s] essence is numerically identical with God’s essence.
  5. So, the Father is Trinitarian. [3,4]
  6. But if Trinitarianism is true, then the Father is not Trinitarian.
  7. So, Trinitarianism is not true. [5,6]
  • Premise (1) seems true since God has no accidents (under DDS) and hence couldn’t be accidentally Trinitarian. He could only be essentially Trinitarian. (Where S is essentially F if it is true that necessarily, if S exists, then S is F)
  • Premise (2) seems to follow from Leibniz’s Law (if x=y, then Fx iff Fy).
  • Premise (4) seems to be a core commitment of the Christian tradition: the Father is fully divine in the sense of having the Divine essence.

Potential response: ‘Triune’ is an attribute of the Godhead, but not an attribute of divinity.

Potential reply: This might help non-classical theists, but it introduces multiple intrinsic attributes in God. And that’s incompatible with DDS.

Aside: Here’s another way to put the argument, where ‘Trinitarian’ means ‘is one entire entity/being existing in three persons’:

  1. Both the Trinitarian Godhead and each of the three persons have one and the same divine nature or essence. [Conciliar Trinitarianism]
  2. The Trinitarian Godhead is essentially Trinitarian. [Couldn’t be accidentally Trinitarian; must be essentially Trinitarian]
  3. If x and y have one and the same nature or essence, then x is essentially F iff y is essentially F. [Follows from Leibniz’s Law, which follows from the Law of Non-Contradiction].
  4. So, each of the divine persons is also Trinitarian. [1-3]
  5. But if Trinitarianism is true, it is false that each of the divine persons is also Trinitarian.
  6. So, Trinitarianism is not true. [4,5]

6 One in essence

Consider:

  1. If DDS is true, then if x is divine, then x is numerically identical with the divine nature. [DDS]
  2. The Father is divine and the Son is divine.
  3. So, if DDS is true, then the Father is numerically identical with the divine nature, and the Son is numerically identical with the divine nature. [1,2]
  4. If x is numerically identical with y and z is numerically identical with y, then x is numerically identical with z.
  5. So, if DDS is true, then the Father is numerically identical with the Son. [3,4]
  6. If Trinitarianism is true, then the Father is not numerically identical with the Son.
  7. So, if DDS is true, then Trinitarianism is not true. [5,6]

Here’s a related experimental argument:

Now, either the Son is one in essence with God’s essence or not. If not, then Trinitarianism is false. But (we are supposing) Trinitarianism is true. So, the Son is one in essence with God’s essence. Now, God is numerically identical to God’s essence (according to DDS). So, the Son is one in essence with God. But the Son has no accidents that effect composition with the Son’s essence, so the Son is his essence.

  • What about the relations the Son stands in? Well, those are either essential or not. If they are not essential, then the Son could have failed to stand in those relations. But that seems absurd—the Godhead is necessarily trinitarian, not merely contingently Trinitarian. If the Son failed to stand in the relation of being begotten (say), it seems that the Son wouldn’t be who he is. But that isn’t possible—the Son necessarily exists. So, it seems the relations are essential to the Son. But since the Son’s essence is one with God’s essence (and hence God himself), it follows that the relations are essential to God himself as well.

But the Son’s essence is identical to (i.e. one with) God’s essence, which is identical to (one with) God. So, the Son is identical with God (in the robust, Leibnizian sense). So, whatever is true of the Son is true of God (and vice versa). But God himself is not begotten from anything; there is nothing apart from God from which God could proceed or ‘be begotten’. But the Son is begotten from something distinct from him (even if that distinction is cast in terms of a relational opposition). So, something is true of the Son that is not true of God. So, the Son both is and is not identical to God.[9]

[9] Once again, all of the arguments in this post are experimental. Perhaps all will return a null result! If so, that would be a beautiful treasure in its own right.

7 Multiplicity (allegedly) requires a cause

Whenever there’s a compresence of a multiplicity of n1, n2, n3, etc., there’s always the question: what accounts for why the nn’s are unified or together?

We cannot appeal to one of those very nn’s, for that would be part of the very thing we are seeking an explanation for. We would therefore have to appeal to some sort of extrinsic principle or cause that accounts for the unity of n1, n2, n3, etc. And this is an anathema to the Divine Nature, which cannot be subject to any kind of actualization or cause or whatever.

If we respond that the explanation of the unity is simply the metaphysical necessity of the unity, then the same response can be made by someone who thinks contingent composite things are ultimately explained by a metaphysically necessary composite thing, and yet another motivation for classical theism collapses (from composite being to utterly non-composite being).

More generally, we need some principled difference between (i) the multiplicity of persons within God and (ii) the multiplicity of features (i.e. positive ontological items) in something [I’ll just call these component ‘parts’ from now on], such that this difference accounts for why a cause is needed for (ii) but not for (i).

From my sight, here are lots of failed examples of what one might (mistakenly) propose as a motivation for the demand of a cause in the case of (ii) but not in (i):

  • Contingency of the subject of composition (fails b/c type (ii) composition can be necessary)
  • Contingency of the inter-part relations and links to one another (fails b/c type (ii) is such that the interpart relations can be necessary)
  • Intrinsically generated (fails b/c type (ii) is such that its multiplicity can be intrinsically generated)
  • Internal intelligibility (fails b/c type (ii) is such that the reason as to why type (ii) parts are unified could easily be a kind of internal intelligibility as opposed to an extrinsic cause)
  • One of those very nn’s accounts for their compresence/unity [e.g. the Father] (fails b/c then–in the case of type (ii) composition–one of the very component features of something could account for the compresence of all of that thing’s features)
  • And so on

It seems to me that the only remaining thing that could spawn the motivation of a cause of substance S in the case of type (ii) composition would simply be the presence of a real multiplicity of genuinely distinct nn’s such that n1, n2, n3, and so on are not identical and the nn’s are intrinsic to [within, in] S. And once we see this, we see that the motivation equally applies to Trinitarian multiplicity (i.e. type (i) multiplicity). In short, if you want to argue from composite being to simple being, then it seems you must also argue from a multiplicity of persons within the Godhead to an extrinsic cause of the Godhead–in terms of, say, the impersonal Plotinean One.

Here’s how I put this ‘experimental argument’ in a transcript of my recent video on Pruss’ LCA:

8 Processions and DDS

I’ve gestured in a previous section towards the following experimental argument, but here’s a slightly different way of putting it.

Eternal processions seem to constitute some sort of priority/posteriority relation (after all, the Son literally receives/derives his existence from the Father. And, plausibly, x’s receiving/deriving existence from y entails that x is ontologically posterior to y). But that’s disallowed under DDS—there cannot be two distinct items, one of which is prior to the other, intrinsic to God. Moreover, how can the Son and God be one in essence if God is essentially independent of everything (i.e. not ontologically posterior to anything) whereas the Son is dependent (in the sense of being ontologically posterior) on the Father?

9 Incarnation, Trinity, and Simplicity: Oh My!

  1. The Son has two natures. [Doctrine of the Incarnation]
  2. Whatever has two natures is composite. [The classical theistic tradition has often insisted that if x is distinct from x’s nature, then x is composite. See, e.g., ST I q3a3]
  3. If DDS is true, then whatever is divine is not composite.
  4. So, if DDS is true, the Son is not divine. [1-3]
  5. If Trinitarianism is true, then the Son is divine.
  6. So, if DDS is true, then Trinitarianism is not true. [4,5]

One potential way to avoid this argument is to modify what we mean by ‘composite’ and ‘simple’. We might, for instance, say that x is simple just in case x has a nature N such that N is simple [in the sense of having no positive ontological item intrinsic to N but distinct from N]. In that case, premise (2) would be false, since something could have two natures and still be properly deemed ‘simple’ or non-composite–just so long as it has a nature such that there is no positive ontological item intrinsic to this nature but distinct from it.

One potential problem with this approach is that it seems to permit a non-classical theist to claim that the non-CTist God is simple, since the non-CTist God–though numerically distinct from his nature, having accidents, and (perhaps) being temporal–could very well ‘have a nature such that this nature is simple’, so long as the divine nature (though not God himself) has no positive ontological items intrinsic to but distinct from it. [And this, in turn, will likely throw a wrench into many natural theological arguments that attempt to establish classical theism (or DDS) in particular.]

10 Multiplicity of Divine Acts

Divine simplicity affirms that all of God’s acts are identical to one another and to God himself, such that there is only a single divine act. But consider the Father’s act of generating the Son and the Father and Son’s joint act (or else the Father’s act) of spirating the Spirit. These seem to be obviously distinct acts: one of them generates the Son, the other one doesn’t generate the Son; one of them spirates the Spirit, the other doesn’t spirate the Spirit; one of them is a joint, cooperative act (spiration) whereas another is a single, non-cooperative act (generation);

Author [Experimenter!]: Joe

Email: majestyofreason@gmail.com

References

Anselm. Proslogion. Hackett Publishing Company. Translated by T. Williams (1995).

Augustine. On the Trinity.

Bergmann, M. & Brower, J.E. 2006. “A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity)”. In D. W. Zimmerman (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brower, J. E. 2009. “Simplicity and Aseity”. In T. P. Flint & M. C. Rea (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dolezal, J.E. 2011. God Without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness. Eugene: Pickwick Publications.

Fakhri, O. Forthcoming. “Another Look at the Modal Collapse Argument”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.

Feser, E. 2017. Five Proofs of the Existence of God. Ignatius Press.

Gavrilyuk, P.L. 2019. “Plotinus on Divine Simplicity”. Modern Theology, 35(3): 442-451.

Grant, W.M. 2012. “Divine Simplicity, Contingent Truths, and Extrinsic Models of Divine Knowing”. Faith and Philosophy, 29: 254-274.

Grant, W.M. and Spencer, M.K. 2015. “Activity, Identity, and God: A Tension in Aquinas and His Interpreters”. Studia Neoaristotelica, 12: 5-61.

Grant, W.M. 2019. Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Rogers, K.A. 1996. “The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity”. Religious Studies,32: 165-186.

Schmid, J.C. and Mullins, R.T. Forthcoming. “The Aloneness Argument Against Classical Theism”. Religious Studies.

Spencer, M.K. 2017. “The Flexibility of Divine Simplicity: Aquinas, Scotus, Palamas”. International Philosophical Quarterly, 57(2): 123-139.

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Vallicella, W. F. 2019. “Divine Simplicity”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/

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